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NOTES
VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND THE DANGER OF
DOMESTICATION OF THE RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE PARADIGM
CHRISTA OBOLD-ESHLEMAN*
Victims' rights laws and restorative justice theory seem to
intersect in their mutual concern for reforming our criminaljus-
tice system to include the people most affected by any given
crime. A few victims' rights laws include the language of "restora-
tive justice."' Some commentators have labeled restorative jus-
tice as an outgrowth of the victims' rights movement,2 and others
link the two concepts in proposed reforms of the justice system.3
But are victims' rights laws really compatible with restorative jus-
tice? The answer is complex and highly dependent on one's view
of the essence of restorative justice. The analysis yields a caution-
ary result for those interested in the restorative justice model,
and suggests that a shift in the underlying theory of rights is nec-
essary to arrive at a restorative conception of victims' rights.
This Note first examines the basic ideas and philosophies of
restorative justice, followed by some of the main concepts and
provisions in victims' rights laws. It then analyzes victims' rights
concepts in the context of a restorative justice paradigm. Finally,
this Note suggests points at which proponents of restorative jus-
tice should embrace victims' rights, and areas in which restora-
* J.D. Candidate 2004, Notre Dame Law School; Thomas J. White
Scholar 2002-2004; B.A. 1997, Eastern Mennonite University. Special thanks to
Donald Schmid for his assistance in the formation of this Note, to Tammy
Krause and Paolo Carozza for their help, and to my husband, Stephen, for his
support during the writing process.
1. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 1214(3) (F) (West 2002).
2. See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restora-
tive Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 717, 720 (2000) (calling restorative justice an "aspect of the victims' right
movement").
3. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Com-
munity, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REv. 751, 755 (2000) (linking the goals of the
victims' rights movement and those of the restorative justice movement).
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tive justice advocates should be more cautious about
collaboration in the institutionalization of victims' rights.
I. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
A. Defining Restorative Justice
While no single definition of restorative justice is agreed upon by
all its adherents,4 some basic tenets can be extracted from the
various writers on the subject. Howard Zehr was among the first
to coherently articulate a philosophy of restorative justice.5 He
explained the restorative justice perspective in the following way:
"Crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obli-
gations to make things right. Justice involves the victim, the
offender, and the community in a search for solutions which pro-
mote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance."6 These three basic
ideas have also been identified by others as the fundamental
principles in any restorative justice theory.7
The principles of restorative justice are readily distinguished
from those of the current criminal justice system in the United
States.' First, whereas restorative justice focuses on crime as
harm to specific victims, our current justice system defines crime
as breaking the law, thus causing harm to the state as the repre-
sentative of society in general. Accordingly, rather than the spe-
cific victims, the state is the primary party in dealing with the
offense in our current system. Second, restorative justice pro-
motes accountability by the offender to the victims to make
amends. Our current system deals with guilt, punishment, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and/or rehabilitation of the offender by
the state, but not primarily with repairing the harm to the vic-
tims.9 Third, restorative justice urges a process that involves the
4. See DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUS-
TICE 27 (2d ed. 2002).
5. See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUS-
TICE (1990).
6. Id. at 181.
7. See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 49 (adding the goal of
"reducing the likelihood of future harm").
8. See VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 49; ZEHR, supra note 5, at
184-85.
9. Granted, many jurisdictions allow orders of restitution as part of the
sentence for offenders; some jurisdictions even require it in certain cases. See,
e.g., Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2000).
Even the MVRA, however, implies that this is just another sort of penalty for the
offender. See § 3663A(a) (1) (requiring restitution "in addition to or in lieu of,
any other penalty"). Interpretation of the MVRA is split among the circuits as
to whether the required restitution is punishment or equitable relief for vic-
tims. See U.S. v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the restitu-
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victim, offender, and their communities in finding a consensual
solution to the problems created by the offense. Meanwhile, our
criminal justice process employs an adversarial model in dealing
with the harm, pitting the offender against the state, and the
abstract interests of the offender's liberty"° against the state's
interests in societal security. Zehr argued that restorative justice
involves nothing less than a paradigm shift-a change in pre-
sumptions-in how we view justice."
B. Philosophies Underlying Restorative Justice
The contrasts between traditional criminal justice and
restorative justice beg the question of what philosophies underlie
our current criminal justice system, as compared to those under-
lying restorative justice. At present, two main ideologies under-
pin the justification of our criminal justice system. These
ideologies are, of course, the utilitarian and retributive theories.
There has been much debate over, or alternatively ignoring of,
the fact that these two accepted principles of our current crimi-
nal justice system are often incompatible. 2 If one operates on a
retributive or desert theory, a certain crime theoretically deserves
a certain amount of punishment based on an ordinal ranking of
the seriousness of offenses in terms of blameworthiness of the
offender. 3 On the other hand, the utilitarian theories of deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation respond to an offender
based on ideas of what will be the best outcome for the most
people. Utilitarian ends may include the security of society or
perception thereof, the prevention of crime, and the change of
the criminal into a law-abiding citizen. Many have tried to recon-
cile the two competing modes of thought, coming up with com-
tion required by the MVRA is punishment for ex post facto purposes; U.S. v.
Newman, 144 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that restitution is not punish-
ment). Nonetheless, the prosecutors and the State do not and cannot currently
represent the victims' interests in the criminal procedure, as this would often
entail a conflict of interest between the State's interests and the victims' wishes.
As reflected in the MVRA, the State's interests are considered paramount in this
situation. See § 3663A(c) (3) (B) (stating that restitution is not required in cases
so complex that "the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by
the burden on the sentencing process").
10. While the offender's interest in liberty as far as not being imprisoned
is quite concrete and proximate, the liberty interests that are asserted in proce-
dural maneuvers, for example to exclude certain evidence in the trial, are far
more attenuated and removed from the common person's understanding of
justice.
11. ZEHR, supra note 5, at 180-81.
12. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1442 (2001).
13. Id.
2004]
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plicated formulas 4 or fuzzy, discretionary balancing acts. 5
Others subscribe just to one theory or the other,1 6 but leave
those who adhere to the opposite theory completely unsatisfied.
Our legal system has pretended that both utilitarian and retribu-
tive theory can be harmonized,1 7 but the "harmony" is more like
cacophony, failing to offer one coherent theory.
The paradigm of restorative justice offers a viable, poten-
tially cohesive alternative to the clash of utilitarian and retribu-
tive theories."8 While aspects of both retributive and utilitarian
philosophies are present in the restorative justice theory,19
restorative justice should not be seen as a hybrid of the two, but
as something quite distinct from both of them.2" Restorativejus-
tice, like retributive justice, does emphasize the moral element of
justice-that a wrong has been done and justice requires righting
that wrong.2" Unlike retributive theory, however, restorative the-
ory does not focus on the desert of punishment of the offenders
as a means of restoring some metaphysical scales of justice, but
rather focuses on justice as the creation of a concrete obligation
on the offenders to do what they can to remedy the situation.2 2
Like the utilitarian side of our current justice system that aims to
create the best result for the most people, the results of restora-
tive justice have been analyzed as to their statistical efficacy in
deterrence and rehabilitation,2 3 and as to participant satisfac-
14. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Crimi-
nal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).
15. Robinson, supra note 12, at 1441-42 (speaking of the Model Penal
Code and other writers' attempts to balance or combine utilitarianism and
retributivism).
16. Examples would be theorists such as Jeremy Bentham and Kent
Greenawalt for utilitarian theory and Immanuel Kant, Jeffrie Murphy, and C.S.
Lewis for retributive theory.
17. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (1985) (listing among its princi-
ples of construction goals that are alternately consistent with either retributive
or utilitarian theories); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A(3) (2001)
(stating a choice between theories was unnecessary "because in most sentencing
decisions the application of either philosophy will produce the same or similar
results").
18. The theory is only "potentially" cohesive because restorative justice is
still so young as a theory that much work still needs to be done to make neces-
sary refinements to articulate a coherent philosophy.
19. See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 44.
20. The view that restorative justice should be understood as a new theory
apart from retributivism or utilitarianism would not be shared by all theorists.
21. See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 44.
22. See, e.g., ZEHR, supra note 5, at 186.
23. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pes-
simistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Assessing
Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts].
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tion.24 However, at least for many restorative theorists, the value
of restorative justice comes not just from its success in making
society safer, but rather (similar in this way to retributive theory)
the value of the theory comes from its morality as a vision for
societal order, with its emphasis on appropriate relationships
between people, and how to create those appropriate relation-
ships.25 The distinction between traditional theories and restora-
tive justice has been lost on many,26 indicating a need for more
clarity in restorative justice language and a better articulation of
a comprehensive underlying theory.
1. Worldviews Underlying Conventional Justice and
Restorative Justice
The underlying set of assumptions through which one views
reality, a worldview or paradigm, affects the conclusions one
reaches about justice because it shapes the way questions are
asked and the types of solutions that seem to make sense.
2 7 At a
basic level, three ways of viewing humanity exist.2s The first may
be called atomic or individualist, in which a human is autono-
mous in knowledge and the world is comprised of such individ-
ual units.2 ' An individualist worldview would be primarily
interested in autonomy and self-actualization, with social institu-
24. See, e.g., MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
25. Like retributive theory, any theory based on morality is inherently
religious or normative in nature, whether or not it is couched in those terms.
Thus, it is not surprising that a number of restorative justice theoreticians have
rationalized the theory through Christian doctrine. See infra notes 41-55 and
accompanying text.
26. Some commentators have equated restorative justice with rehabilita-
tion. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism,
and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29
FoRDHAM URn. L. J. 2063, 2063 n.1 (2002). Of the few published cases that
include the term "restorative justice," a significant number include a faulty
description of the theory. See West v. Keane, No. 93 CIV. 6680(JFK), 1997 WL
266977, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997) (calling a Victim Offender Reconciliation
Program "a therapeutic program . . .aimed primarily at 'healing' criminal
offenders"); Lewis v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 615 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980)
(equating restorative justice with restitution).
27. See, e.g., ZEHR, supra note 5, at 87-94 (citing the pre-seventeenth cen-
tury worldview that the earth was the center of the universe, which shaped the
(now believed faulty) questions and conclusions of science for centuries).
28. Jonathan Burnside, Tension and Tradition in the Pursuit of Justice, in
RELATIONAL JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE BREACH 42, 50-51 (Jonathan Burnside &
Nicola Baker eds., 1994).
29. Id.
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tions as mediating influences between individuals.3 ° An organic
or oceanic worldview is at the other end of the spectrum, in
which the good of the community is of paramount importance(over the individual good), and conflict is suppressed for the
sake of harmony.3 The final paradigm is the relational
worldview, in which relationships are the basic building blocks of
society, and "'the Self exists only in dynamic relation with the
Other."'3 2 The human ideal in the relational worldview has been
termed by one commentator to be "compassionate strength," a
concept meant to express an integrated concern for both self
and community in the pursuit of transformative growth.33
Our current criminal justice system operates on the assump-
tion that an adversarial system that pits alleged offenders against
the state, and that objectively weighs the offense to determine
punishment, will bring us to a desired state of equilibrium, which
isjustice. This view seems to fall largely into the individualist par-
adigm, in the sense that people are expected to act, and arejudged, as autonomous beings. Government is necessary to
maintain order among individuals and to ensure that the individ-
uals all have the freedom and equality necessary to their individ-
ual pursuits of happiness.34 At the same time, however, we seem
to have threads of the organic worldview in our utilitarian theo-
ries which are concerned not with the autonomous individual,
but with the greatest good for the greatest number of people.35
This is one way in which the traditional United States criminaljustice system attempts to operate under two conflicting theories,
as was argued earlier in this Note.36 Our adversary system may
sound like common sense to those who are accustomed to it, but
30. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION 237-39 (1994).
31. See Burnside, supra note 28, at 50; BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 30, at
239-41.
32. Burnside, supa note 28, at 51 (quotingJOHN MAcMURRAy, PERSONS IN
RELATION 17 (Humanities Press 1979) (1961)).
33. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 30, at 242.
34. Id. at 238-39.
35. The organic worldview is generally associated with non-Western socie-
ties that place a priority on closely-knit community. Where this thread has
appeared in Western culture, some have argued that it serves not a healthy
purpose, but merely "suppress [es] conflict for the sake of continued oppression
of certain groups." BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 30, at 239-40 (citing LAURA
NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY- JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VIL-
LAGE (1990)).
36. See infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
V2CTIMS' RIGHTMS
it is just one paradigm. It should be relinquished if another para-
digm actually is more reasonable.37
The worldview underlying restorative justice could be viewed
as falling into any one of the three fundamental worldviews-
individualistic, organic, or relational. One could see restorative
justice as simply a tool to better give individuals their fair chance
at self-determination, by requiring an offender to restore the vic-
tim to her original position (an individualist view). Alternately,
one could view restorative justice as an objectively better method
of social control than other methods, ultimately lowering the
conflict level of society (an organic view). These conceptions of
restorative justice are arguably what is being adopted into our
criminal justice system through victims' rights statutes, as dis-
cussed below."8 If the concept of restorative justice is integrated
into the criminal justice system under these philosophies, how-
ever, it will not live up to its potential of being something quite
different from what we now have.
Rather, the restorative justice paradigm should be described
in terms of a relational worldview.39 This is the paradigm that
makes the most sense in terms of the foundational assertions of
the theory, which bear repeating at this point: "Crime is a viola-
tion of people and relationships. It creates obligations to make
things right. Justice involves the victim, the offender, and the
community in a search for solutions which promote repair, rec-
onciliation, and reassurance."4 ° These three basic premises all
point to the view of the person as existing in the context of rela-
tionships. The restorative paradigm of justice may be very differ-
ent from the traditional paradigm of justice in more ways than
simple use of different methods to arrive at justice. With a rela-
37. Whether it is even possible to speak of one basic theory as more "rea-
sonable" than another is a profound question. Since all philosophies eventually
come down to a set of preliminary assumptions (such as the nature of how we
can know things to be true), it may be actually impossible to debate whether
one philosophy has more merit than another, except in the context of a com-
mon worldview/tradition. See ALASDAIR MACINrvRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? 1-11 (1988). Maclntyre goes on to argue, however, that pluralis-
tic views cannot all ultimately have equal claims to truth, and that finally, "tradi-
tions defeat and are defeated by other traditions depending on how well they
are able to overcome 'epistemological crises."' Id. at 362; see also Jonathan
Burnside, Tension and Tradition in the Pursuit of Justice, in RELATIONAL JUSTICE:
REPAIRING THE BREACH 42, 50 (Jonathan Burnside & Nicola Baker eds., 1994)
(citing the same passage). For further discussion of how entire paradigm
changes occur through crises in our understanding of how we know what we
know, see ZEHR, supra note 5, at 89-94.
38. See infra Section II.
39. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 30 at 229-59.
40. ZEHR, supra note 5, at 181.
2004]
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tional paradigm as its foundation, restorative justice will ask dif-
ferent questions to determine what justice entails as a theory;
only then can concrete methods be determined.
2. Religious Perspectives on Restorative Justice
Some restorative justice theorists, Zehr among them, arrived
at a restorative theory through Christian biblical analysis.'" With-
out attempting a comprehensive biblical exegesis here, this sec-
tion highlights some of the main points made by some
theoreticians. The Old Testament concept of "shalom" (often
translated as "peace") is central. It "refers to a condition of 'all
rightness,' of things being as they should be, in various dimen-
sions. '"42 Part of this condition is being in correct relationships
with God and other people.4" The social form of such "correct
relationships" was covenant with God and other people.44 The
conception of justice arose from the covenant relationship of
God with the people,4" and therefore the meaning of justice is
"to make things right" in terms of relationships.46 In the case of
a crime, making things right involved a punishment aimed at res-
toration of the offender to the community, or a settlement pro-
cess between the aggrieved parties.47 This interpretation belies a
common view that the Old Testament supports retaliatory justice.
The biblical New Testament seems even more radical in its
many parables and teachings that urge "aggressive goodwill
toward one's abusers."4 Christopher Marshall argues that the
41. See, e.g., CHARLES W. COLSON,JUSTICE THAT RESTORES (2001); CHRISTO-
PHER D. MARSHALL, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: A NEW TESTAMENT VISION FOR JUS-
TICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT (2001); DANIEL W. VAN NESS, CRIME AND ITS
VICrIMS (1986); ZEHR, supra note 5.
42. ZEHR, supra note 5, at 130 (relying on PERRY B. YODER, SHALOM: THE
BIBLE'S WORD FOR SALVATION, JUSTICE, AND PEACE (1987)); see also VAN NESS,
supra note 41, at 120 (stating that shalom "includes notions of harmony, con-
tentment, and reconciliation. It is the ideal state in which the community is to
function").
43. ZEHR, supra note 5, at 131.
44. Id. at 133.
45. Id. at 137. See also VAN NESS, supra note 41, at 121 ("The full meaning
of justice is to establish once again the shalom that existed before the offense.
Justice is active and relational and it is redemptive in its intent.").
46. ZEHR, supra note 5, at 139. This concept ofjustice encompasses more
than criminal justice. It also deals with oppression, and emphasizes liberation.
Id.
47. Id. at 141-42. Punishment could also be aimed at breaking the bonds
of oppression by removing the power of the oppressor. Id. at 142.
48. CHRISTOPHER D. MARSHALL, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: A NEW TESTAMENT
VISION FOR JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 90 (2001). Examples of such
teachings include the following: "'Do not judge, or you too will be judged,'"
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New Testament writers portray through the life of Jesus "an
understanding of God's justice as a redemptive power that breaks
into situations of oppression or need in order to put right what is
wrong and restore relationships to their proper condition."
49
This biblical restorative framework has lead such theorists and
some church bodies5" to look for a modern-day framework that
similarly does justice in a restorative manner.
Other spiritual bases for restorative justice have been noted
as well. Restorative justice models have been inspired by the
traditional conflict resolution practices of Aboriginal groups in
Australia and New Zealand, and Native American groups in the
United States. Theorists have observed that spirituality has been
intrinsic to the indigenous models. Navajos have a word that
roughly translates to "living in right relationship."'" When this
ideal state of affairs is violated, a peacemaking circle may be initi-
ated.52 Supernatural assistance is presumed to be a part of the
process. 53 Aboriginal Australians, New Zealand Maoris, and
Native Americans tend to place value on the attendance by an
elder with spiritual gifts at a restorative conference.54 Even theo-
rists who base their restorative justice theories more on non-relig-
ious moral values or utilitarian views of "what works best" have
said that a certain sense of spirituality in the process can help. 5
Matthew 7:1 (New International Version); the incident of the woman caught in
adultery, the societal punishment for which was stoning, when Jesus said "'If
any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her,'" John
8:7 (New International Version); "'Love your enemies,"' Matthew 5:44 (New
International Version).
49. MARSHALL, supra note 48, at 93; see also GERALD AUSTIN McHUGH,
CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 145-65 (1978) (arguing that the biblical pillars of love
and forgiveness require for Christians a view ofjustice as transformation toward
those ideals).
50. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Responsibility,
Rehabilitation, and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice
(2000), available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/criminal.htm ("A Catholic
approach leads us to encourage models of restorative justice that seek to
address crime in terms of the harm done to victims and communities, not sim-
ply as a violation of law.").
51. James W. Zion, The Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking, 14 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 1, 67 (1998).
52. Id
53. Id.
54. Braithwaite, Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 23,
at 25 (citing Juan Tauri & Allison Morris, Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori
Processes, 30 AUSTL. & N.Z.J. CRIMINOLOGY, 149, 149-50 (1997)).
55. See, e.g., id. at 25; Kay Pranis, Restorative Justice, Social Justice, and the
Empowerment of Marginalized Populations, in RESTORATVE COMMUNITYJUSTICE 287,
301-302 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001) (citing the spirituality of
2004]
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3. Feasibility of a Relational Paradigm for the United States
Justice System
Some might say a relational value system is fine for tribal
societies, but is contrary to our nation's ideal of rugged individu-
alism. Individualism, though, has its limits, and is arguably not
particularly helpful in today's modern society. The concept of
American individualism gained prominence in the nineteenth
century, when much of American law was being first formulated.
Laissez-faire and capitalistic individualism emphasized freedom
and autonomy, and the behavioral sciences centered on social
Darwinism; any aberrant behavior was an individual defect. 6
Unlike law, though, modern social science has largely left
the individualistic concept behind, in favor of a contextual
model where people's social contexts play a very large role in
determining their behavior. 7 In addition, most of our business
is done not as the lone cowboy out on the range or the solitary
brilliant capitalist, but is in bureaucracies and teams, where dif-
ferent people are dependent on each other's work.5" The crimi-
nal law needs to recognize the importance of social context and
community as well. While the importance of family and civic
associations has been touted by politicians in other areas of pub-
lic policy,59 their potential role in crime and conflict occurrence,
prevention, and resolution has been downplayed in favor of
holding the individual accountable only to the state through
punishment. Even if it could be said that American society does
not have a strong sense of community, restorative justice that
involves community members should actually promote more
cohesive communities in our society. Increasing the participa-
manyjustice reformers, and recommending a non-religious spirituality rooted
in aspirational human qualities such as "empathy and enhancing the well being
of others").
56. Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model ofJustice,
8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 5-6 (2002).
[T]he overarching view of human nature that characterized this
period [was] psychological individualism, one whose central components
were the belief that individuals were the causal locus of behavior, that
socially problematic and illegal behavior therefore arose from some
defect in the individuals who performed it, and that such behavior
could be changed or eliminated only by effecting changes in the
nature or characteristics of those problematic persons.
Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id. at 49.
59. The debates over school vouchers and faith-based community initia-
tives provide ample examples of exhortation of the value of devolving power
from the government to smaller groups of people.
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tion of immediate communities in criminal justice processes pro-
motes a sense of ownership and responsibility for the welfare of
its members.60 Arguably, restorative justice may have the most
community-building impact in the areas that now are the most
disenfranchised with the least amount of social support.6' There-
fore, while some say community is a means of restorative justice,
some also find it to be an end, 62 an end both relevant and impor-
tant to American society.
C. Restorative Methodology
The methods of restorative justice are many. Multiple theo-
reticians have posited two basic conceptions of restorative jus-
tice. 63 One is focused on the process-bringing together all
those affected by the crime to discuss what has happened and to
agree on what is to be done. The second conception, "values
theory," is that restorative justice is anything dealing with restora-
tive values or actions.64 The process theory heavily emphasizes
some form of face-to-face meeting between the relevant parties.
This might be in the form of mediation between the main victim
and offender,65 a conference between victim, offender, and rep-
resentatives of their communities,66 or conferencing with victim,
60. Pranis, supra note 55, at 293.
61. Braithwaite, Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 23,
at 84-85.
62. Lode Walgrave, Extending the Victim Perspective Towards a Systemic Restor-
ative Justice Alternative, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 253, 254 (Adam Crawford &Jo Goodey eds., 2000).
63. SeeJohn Braithwaite & Heather Strang, Introduction: Restorative Justice
and Civil Society, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1, 1-2 (Heather
Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001); Walgrave, supra note 62, at 259-60.
64. See Braithwaite & Strang, supra note 63, at I (citing values of "healing
(restoration) rather than hurting"); Walgrave, supra note 62, at 260 (defining
restorative justice as "'every action that is primarily oriented towards doing jus-
tice by restoring the harm that has been caused by a crime'" (quoting Gordon
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, In Search of Fundamentals and an Outline for Systemic
Reform, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME
45, 48 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999)).
65. See, e.g., ZEHR, supra note 5 at 158-74 (describing the Victim Offender
Reconciliation Programs).
66. See, e.g., Lorenn Walker, Conferencing-A New Approach forJuvenileJus-
tice in Honolulu, 66 FED. PROBATION 38, 38 (2002) (describing conferencing as "a
group reconciliation process . . . facilitated by a neutral third party, and
reach[ing] decisions by consensus"). Defining the concept of "community" is
admittedly difficult and has been discussed at length by numerous commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Kay Pranis, Conferencing and the Community, at http://
www.restorativepractices.org/Pages/nacc/nacc-pra.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2003) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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offender, and their families.67 The outcome of the meeting
would be assumed to be appropriate if an appropriate process
has been followed,68 though the fairness of the outcome would
be highly subjective to the parties and could vary radically from
case to case. This subjectivity seems to describe what Frederick
Schauer calls a "consensus theory of truth," which involves
"defining truth in terms of the process of the discussion."69
Whatever is agreed upon is considered to be correct or true.7 °
With this theory, determining the appropriate process is
essential.
A "values" theory of restorative justice encompasses a far
wider variety of processes, since its focus is on whatever leads to
the values of "healing (restoration) rather than hurting."71 Such
a theory could include coercive judicial system methods that
arrive at restitution, community service, apology, or some other
consequence, 72 as long as they were aimed at repairing the con-
crete harms that had occurred.7" This focus on the harm is what
would distinguish the restorative justice framework from the
retributive or rehabilitative purposes that restitution or commu-
nity service play in our current justice system.7 ' Restitution, in
restorative justice, is aimed at restoring whatever losses the vic-
tims have experienced. Community service can be seen as restor-
ing losses that the broader society has experienced as a result of
67. Family group conferences are often employed when the offender is a
child. See, e.g., Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, The Practice of Family Group
Conferences in New Zealand: Assessing the Place, Potential, and Pitfalls of Restorative
Justice, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBATES 207 (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000).
68. See Braithwaite & Strang, supra note 63, at 1-2 (noting that someone
espousing the process theory might say that a single-victim, single-offender
mediation is not restorative because it does not involve other relevant persons
in the community, while the same theorist could think that an outcome of can-
ing the offender would be fine if the proper process is observed).
69. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19-20
(1982).
70. Id. (arguing that the consensus theory of truth most aptly fits the free
speech model of the "marketplace of ideas" in which the value of an idea
(goods) is solely determined by what is assigned to it by the people who com-
pose the market).
71. Braithwaite & Strang, supra note 63, at 1.
72. Walgrave, supra note 62, at 273-74 (stating that "coercive restorative
sanctions" do not fully achieve the potential of restorative justice, but are better
than the alternative retributive and rehabilitative sanctions because of a) the
focus on the victim and the harm, b) better reintegration of the offender into
the community, and c) having the coercive option creates more of a coherent,
universally-applicable restorative theory).
73. Id. at 260.
74. See id. at 260; see also infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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crime."h For the "values" theoretician, a restorative process is
optional.
While some would argue that the latter concept is most
important,76 others offer a more convincing argument that a
combination of both conceptions of restorative justice is the most
helpful, and possibly essential to truly restorative justice.77 Some
of the significance of a choice between process theory and values
theory becomes clearer when applied to the practical question of
how victims' rights relate to restorative justice.
II. VICTIMS' RIGHTS
Victims have largely been left out of the prosecution and res-
olution of crimes in common law jurisdictions since the kings in
Britain consolidated their power around the twelfth century.
The kings declared crimes a "breach of the king's peace" in
which the king was the victim, and assumed jurisdiction over the
incidents. 78 The lack of a central role for the actual victims had
not always been the case, as private prosecution and retribution
or informal solutions were the norm for most of world history
before that time.79
During the 1960's or 1970's, a victims' rights movement
began forming in the United States.8 ° A number of reasons for
the emergence of the movement have been identified. The
beginnings of victimology theory,8 ' a response to civil rights activ-
ity,82 and a backlash to Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's
(such as Miranda v. Arizona8 8 ) that afforded constitutional pro-
75. Id. at 269 (noting that societal losses might include loss of security or
sense of order). Walgrave admits the difference may not be readily apparent to
the average observer between the restorative use of community service and the
retributive use (punishment through an "unpleasant, and even degrading,
task") or rehabilitative use (teaching the offender about being a good citizen).
Id. at 270-71. He argues, however, that an explicit distinction between the
underlying values of restoration, retribution, and rehabilitation is essential, and
will shape how the service is ordered and how it is understood by all parties. See
id. at 271.
76. See, e.g., id. at 260.
77. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Strang, supra note 63, at 2.
78. VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 1.
79. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the CriminalJustice Process:
Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 21, 23 (1999).
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 26.
82. See ROBERT EuAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM: CRIME VIcTIMS AND COMPEN-
SATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1983).
83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tections to criminal suspects8 4 have all been identified as founda-
tions of the movement.
The victims' rights movement gained national attention and
federal support in 1982 when Ronald Reagan established the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. The report issued
by the Task Force detailed recommendations for government
action at all levels as well as recommendation for sectors of civil
society, both of which were aimed at a more victim-friendly crimi-
nal justice system.8 5
Some of the recommendations for governmental action
included passing laws aimed at lessening the fear and traumatiza-
tion of victims. These recommendations included confidentiality
of address information 6 and of counseling records,8 7 and chang-
ing evidentiary requirements to admit hearsay so victims would
not be required to appear in person to testify.88
Other recommendations were to increase security for the
victim and society as against the alleged offender. Here the Task
Force recommended making bail laws stricter,8 9 making convic-
tion of the alleged offender easier by abolishing the exclusionary
rule, 0 abolishing parole, and limiting sentencing discretion91 or
at least allowing the public to attend parole hearings,9 2 and creat-
ing liability for parole officials for negligent release of someone
who later re-offends. 3
A few of the recommendations involved allowing the victims
to have their monetary needs met,9 4 and others were designed to
provide the victim with social services. 5
Finally, the Task Force made several suggestions to allow the
victim an increased role in the prosecution of the alleged
offender, such as keeping the victim informed as to the status of
84. See LEIGH GLENN, VICTIMS' RIGHTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 12
(1997).
85. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT
(1982).
86. See id. at 19-20.
87. See id. at 20-21.
88. See id. at 21-22.
89. See id. at 22-23.
90. See id. at 24-28.
91. Id. at 29-31.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. at 54-55.
94. See id. at 34 (restitution); id. at 37-47 (government-funded
compensation).
95. See id. at 35-36 (government employee assistance programs); id. at
47-49 (victim resource agencies).
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16the prosecution, making victim impact statements mandatory
at sentencing,97 requiring prosecutors to present victims' views
on various matters to the court,"8 and allowing victims to attend
hearings, even if they are witnesses. 99
The states have adopted the recommendations in varying
degrees through statutes and constitutional amendments.'0° In
addition, victims' rights amendments to the U.S. Constitution
have been proposed a number of times, but have not yet been
passed.' 0 '
While the victims' rights movement has spread to all of the
states and the federal government, there is a lack of consensus
on the philosophy underlying the movement. The President's
Task Force stated that as a response to the unheeded pleas of
victims for justice and for help, the Task Force was to bring the
criminal justice system back to "the simple truth that it is sup-
posed to be fair and to protect those who obey the law while
punishing those who break it."' ' Another interpretation is that
people "became tired of seeing convicted criminals receive
sentences lighter than what they believed served the ideals of
punishment and deterrence."' 0 '
Professor Robert Mosteller divides victims' rights advocates
into three groups based on their underlying philosophies.14
The first group includes the advocates who have the goal of gain-
ing participatory rights for victims in the criminal justice pro-
cess.10 5 The second group has a pro-prosecution slant, aimed at
more and harsher convictions through favorably balancing vic-
tims' rights against offenders'."0 6 The final group Mosteller
describes is composed of those who want greater victim aid and
protection from the government. 10 7 While the goal of using vic-
96. Id. at 60-61 (police); id. at 64 (prosecutors).
97. Id. at 33, 76-78.
98. Id. at 65-66.
99. Id. at 80.
100. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 79.
101. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003).
102. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 85, at
vi-vii.
103. GLENN, supra note 84 at 3.
104. Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitiution: Moving from
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1053 (1998).
105. Id. at 1054.
106. Id.
107. Id. Victims' rights in Europe have largely followed the aid model,
with organizations having the objectives "primarily to alleviate suffering."
Heather Strang, The Crime Victim Movement as a Force in Civil Society, in RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY supra note 63, at 69, 75.
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tims' rights simply as a way to obtain more punishment for
offenders cannot support restorative ideals, the participatory
rights and victim aid visions seem facially compatible with the
restorative justice framework as steps toward restoration of the
harm. The question is whether such goals must be restorative in
practice.
As victims' rights laws increasingly shape the criminal justice
process, it is important for advocates of restorative justice, who
are inherently interested in the roles victims play in criminal jus-
tice, to step back and evaluate the goals and philosophies the
laws are serving. While some of the practices demanded by vic-
tims' rights laws, such as restitution, participation in the process,
and forbearance from re-traumatizing the victim during the trial,
are among the practices advocated as part of a restorative justice
paradigm, one should be careful about assuming these practices
are always "restorative." The context and relationship between
practices and philosophies must be considered.
III. VICTIMS' RIGHTS ANALYZED IN A RESTORATIVE PARADIGM
Two possible models of victims' rights exist, according to law
professor Kent Roach: punitive and non-punitive."' The puni-
tive model follows Herbert Packer's classic delineation of the
crime control and due process models of criminal justice.10 9
Packer's crime control model "is based on the proposition that
the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important
function to be performed by the criminal process.'' H Packer's
due process model is concerned with a formal process that will
protect reliability of the truth of outcomes."'
Roach's punitive model of victims' rights encompasses both
of Packer's models. Like both of Packer's models, Roach's puni-
tive model focuses on the past and on the state response to
crime, and draws bright-line categories of victims and offend-
ers. 1 2 Like Packer's crime control model, Roach's punitive
model "assumes that the enactment of a criminal law, prosecu-
tion, and punishment controls crime."1"' The participation of
the victim is seen as a way to legitimize the punishment." 4 Like
108. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VIcrIMs' RiGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND
POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 (1999).
109. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1964).
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 13-14.
112. ROACH, supra note 108, at 29-30.
113. Id. at 30.
114. Id. at 31.
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Packer's due process model, Roach's punitive model uses victims'
rights as a way to counter excessive due process rights for offend-
ers.'1 Roach's punitive model of victims' rights seems to largely
depict the rationale given for current victims' rights laws.116
The non-punitive model of victims' rights focuses on crime
prevention, and, when crime does occur, tries to decrease the
harm through restorative justice.1 7 Restorative justice presents
an alternative to both the crime-control and the due process con-
cepts of the punitive model of rights."1 ' Contrary to the crime-
control model, which focuses on the state as the victim and seeks
to punish for past wrongs, restorative justice looks at the individ-
ual people who have been harmed and how that harm can be
repaired in the present or future.11 9 The due process model, on
the other hand, views the state as a potential perpetrator of rights
violations for the offender, and therefore "focuses on rights to
the exclusion of duties," thus encouraging the offender to deny
as much responsibility as possible. 2° In contrast, restorative jus-
tice, while concerned with having a good process, eschews the
legalism of due process, removes control of the process from
legal professionals, and encourages offenders to take responsibil-
ity.1 21 With such different values from the traditional crime-con-
trol and due process models of our current criminal justice
system, the question of what place rights hold in restorative jus-
tice theory, compared to their obvious place in traditional crimi-
nal theory, is very important.
A number of restorative justice theorists feel that there is a
place for rights (of both victims and offenders) in restorative jus-
tice theory, but that it is in the traditional criminal justice system,
which should be the failsafe only when restorative processes can-
not or do not work.122 Placing "rights" only in traditional crimi-
115. Id. (offering the example of limiting the exclusionary rule, as has
been done through some states' victims' bills of rights).
116. See, e.g., Diane Feinstein & Jon Kyl, A Criminal Imbalance: Victims'
Rights Amendment Will Righten Injustices, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2002, available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/Speeches02/vicoped.htm ("A constitutional
amendment will help balance the scales of justice. Currently, while criminal
defendants have almost two dozen separate constitutional rights-fifteen of
them provided by amendments to the U.S. Constitution-crime victims have
absolutely none.").
117. ROACH, supra note 108, at 34.
118. Id. at 35.
119. Id. at 35-36.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 35.
122. See, e.g., PRANiS, supra note 55, at 300 ("Coercive rights enforcement
remains an important last-recourse strategy when appeals based on respectful,
non-confrontational dialog have failed repeatedly.").
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nal processes may be consistent with a "values" based restorative
theory. But is restorative justice such a different paradigm that
rights are incompatible with ideal restorative processes? And if
so, how can we be certain that some participants will not be trod-
den upon? These are difficult questions for restorative theory.
A. The Inconsistencies of "Rights" with a Restorative System
One of the main problems in comparing or attempting to
synthesize victims' rights with restorative justice is the concept of
"rights" itself. The word "rights" has a number of connotations
in its American usage that may be antithetical to a relational con-
cept of restorative justice: first, objective individualism, removed
from a subjective community context; second, a bright line
between victim and offender; third, an adversarial view of
conflict.
1. Individualism
From a restorative view, one of the shortcomings of our cur-
rent criminal justice system is that it views the criminal act in iso-
lation from the relationships that were harmed, including the
relationships between victim and offender and between offender
and broader community. 23 In reality, the immediate communi-
ties of both the offender and the victim have a stake in the harm
that has occurred, sometimes as co-victims.' 24 The "rights" mod-
els, though, as understood in this country, are largely centered
around individual autonomy that is objectively measured. This
presents a conflict in paradigms.
Leslie Sebba suggests that the decline of the rehabilitation
model of criminal justice has something to do with the rise of
individual rights language and theory.'25 The rehabilitation
model promotes a passive role for the object of rehabilitation,
whether victim or offender, with a pseudo-medical diagnosis of
problem and treatment. The language of rights is more active,
implying a proactive role for victims or offenders in claiming
123. See ZEHR, supra note 5.
124. See, e.g., Richard Young, Integrating a Multi-Victim Perspective into Crimi-
nal Justice Through Restorative Justice Conferences, in INTEGRATING A VIcTIM PERSPEC-
TIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES, supra note 67, at 227,
233 (noting that families suffer in caring for the injured or because of lost
wages of the injured party; witnesses may feel shock or guilt, or the community
in the immediate area may feel a loss of security).
125. Leslie Sebba, The Individualization of the Victim: From Positivism to
Postmodernism, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES, supra note 67, at 55, 64.
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their own rights. 1 26 This may be positive as far as logically lead-
ing to a more participatory system consistent with restorative
goals. 1
27
A danger in the current American system, however, is that
the language of individual autonomy of victims is being stuffed
into a mal-fitting framework of just deserts for offenders. Rights
and individuality of victims are being inserted into the system in a
way so as to use them to determine desert of offenders. Where
once the individuality of the offender was the predominant con-
sideration in determining desert for a particular crime (observ-
ing all the defendant's process rights, scienter, and mitigating
circumstances), now victims' rights and individuality are to be
considered through presentation of individual impact of the
crime and desires for certain outcomes.' 28 The concept of desert
may simply be shifting to consider the individuality of the victim
in determining what punishment the offender deserves for the
crime. This subjectivity does not comport either with the objec-
tive concept of deserts for the offender, nor with offenders'
rights.
The problem is that rights are seen as individual absolutes
granted to autonomous persons. There is little sense of relation-
ship or subjectivity in the American concept of rights, yet subjec-
tivity is what rights such as victim allocution bring to our criminal
justice system. While Sebba thinks that participatory rights that
bring a subjective element can be absorbed in a communitarian
way that could be either vengeance-oriented or restorative,
129
there may be a more fundamental problem in the "rights" lan-
guage itself, in that it is, by definition, focused on individual
autonomy, and is thus anti-relational.
2. Bright Line Between Victim and Offender
A second potential conflict between the language of rights
and restorative justice concepts is that the traditional victims'
rights model bestows "rights" based on drawing a bright line
between victim and offender. The model stresses "the innocence
of victims and the guilt of offenders," and denies any overlap
between the two categories.130 To allow that there may be some
126. Id.
127. But cf ROACH, supra note 108, at 34 (advocating a "public health"
model of crime prevention).
128. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991) ("Victim
impact evidence ... is designed to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as an
individual human being.'").
129. Sebba, supra note 125, at 70.
130. ROACH, supra note 108, at 30.
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responsibility on the victim for the incident is generally eschewed
by victims' rights advocates and lawmakers."' While such advo-
cates are entirely correct that "blaming the victim" is completely
inappropriate in many cases, there are other cases in which the
victims played an active role in their "victimization." The stere-
otypical "ideal victim"1" 2 portrayed by some victims' rights advo-
cates is a person such as an elderly woman who is robbed and
raped in her home or a child molested by her school bus driver.
These are examples taken directly from the report by the Presi-
dent's Task Force.' In fact, all of the many examples given by
the Task Force are "ideal victims" in the sense that they reflect
the stereotypical epitome of an innocent person who inexplica-
bly suffers at the hands of another.
But victims are often not "ideal." The status of some people
as "victim" rather than "offender" is not entirely clear. 134 The
following scenario, in which the parties dispute many of the
details, provides an example. Several African-American teenage
boys were biking through an alley, when a white man in a pickup
drove through at a high rate of speed (according to the boys)
almost hitting one of the boys. (The man said the boys were try-
ing to block his way.) The man then stopped his vehicle ahead
of the boys and yelled racial obscenities and told the boys to go
home. The boys also yelled at the man and may have also used
racial obscenities. Finally, one of the boys punched the man.
The man called the police and the boys were arrested. In this
sort of case, the justice system identifies the man as the victim.
But the story makes clear that the line between victim and
offender is not very clear, even if just one side of the story is
accurate. Both parties had some role in the altercation.
Assigning a bright-line label of "victim" or "offender," and
according rights based on that line, sometimes leads to an inac-
curately dichotomous view of reality. Some victims' rights pro-
grams try to avoid the gray areas by ensuring that only "ideal"
victims are eligible for services. England's Criminal Injuries
131. See Susan Sarnoff, Restoring Justice to the Community: A Realistic Goal?,
65 FED. PROBATION 33, 35 (2001).
132. See David Miers, Taking the Law into their Own Hands: Victims as Offend-
ers, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBATES, supra note 62, at 77, 79 (citing the term coined by Nils
Christie, in Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POL-
ICY 17 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986)).
133. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 85, at 2-3.
134. See, e.g., Young, supra note 124, at 233 (stating that in many events, it
is unclear who initiated the problem and the degree of responsibility between
"victim" and "offender," giving the example of an altercation between intoxi-
cated parties).
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Compensation Authority, for example, awards compensation for
harms to victims only if the victims are found to be without
blame. I"5 The United States' version of national victim compen-
sation awards grants to the states, and the states may decide what
qualifications the victims must have in order to be eligible for
compensation for harm. 136 The states generally at least require
that the victims cooperate with law enforcement in order to be
eligible,' 37 but some states also require that the victim be inno-
cent, or not have contributed to the crime.1 38 These various
requirements signify that at least for this particular right of vic-
tims-the right to compensation for losses-government bodies
have found different ways to draw the bright line between victim
and offender. Some attempt to keep out non-ideal victims, while
others presume that any cooperative people who have been
ascribed the "victim" label in the criminal justice process merit
compensation, no matter what their role in the matter.
The words "victim" and "rights" have become endowed with
symbolic meanings that may distort reality. The association of
the word "victim" with such qualifications as innocence and non-
provocation, combined with "rights," which suggests indepen-
dence over oppression, is a potent rhetorical strategy.13 1 "[T]he
symbolic strength of the term 'victim's rights' overrides careful
scrutiny: Who could be anti-victim?"' 4 ° Because of the distortive
effect of this language, in many cases restorative justice should
not promote these bright lines.
Whether the categories of victim and offender are helpful in
restorative justice is disputed by restorative justice practition-
ers.' Some say that all parties should come to the table without
135. MIERS, supra note 132, at 90.
136. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE CRIME
VICTIM COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAMS (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/compandassist/
fs_000280.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., INDIANA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE VIOLENT CRIME COM-
PENSATION FUND, STATE OF INDIANA, APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS FROM VIOLENT
CRIMES COMPENSATION FUND (1997), available at http://www.state.in.us/cji/
victim/23776.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
139. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv.
937, 951-52 (1985).
140. Id. at 952.
141. Braithwaite, Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, supra note 23,
at 95.
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pre-attached labels, especially in the complex cases.' 4 2 Others
would feel that this unjustly de-emphasizes the violence or other
offending conduct that has been perpetrated by one party.14
Whether or not to label the parties may be especially relevant for
those who emphasize the process aspect of restorative justice
because a good process depends on the theory applied, and the
symbolism of labels may be an important aspect of the theory.
Beyond labeling people as victims or offenders, adding
"rights" to the categories further segregates the parties. In the
case of the less-than-ideal victim, this segregation is not likely to
lead to the sort of accountability compromise between the par-
ties that is necessary to remedy all of the harm done.
3. "Rights" As a Promotion of the Adversarial Model
A third problem with the language of rights is that it pro-
motes an adversarial model ofjustice. One of the roots of restor-
ative justice is that the offenders accept accountability for what
they have done.' 44 From this base, the process can move on to a
consensus on how to repair the hann. Even for those who
embrace a "values" model of restorative justice that would allow
for a broader variety of processes as long as the outcome was
aimed at restoration, there is an argument that an adversarial
process is intrinsically contrary to a restorative resolution.
Because the adversarial process is conceived as the way our jus-
tice system reaches truth and an appropriate resolution, vigorous
argument by each side in favor of their own position is deemed
essential to reach the right conclusion.'45 Adversarial argument
stands in opposition to the restorative model that expects the
parties to reach beyond stubbornly arguing for the best possible
outcome for themselves, and engage in truth-telling of their own
accord in order to come to a consensus on future action for the
good of all concerned.'46 The restorative model is not entirely
142. See, e.g., Young, supra note 124, at 244-45 (arguing that one of the
positive aspects of restorative processes is that "'they leave open multiple inter-
pretations of responsibility while refusing to allow the offender to deny per-
sonal responsibility entirely.'" (quoting John Braithwaite & S. Mugford,
Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders, 34
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139, 146 (1994))).
143. See ROACH, supra note 108, at 30.
144. See, e.g., id. at 35.
145. See, e.g., Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161 (1958) ("[T]he
experienced judge or arbitrator desires and actively seeks to obtain an adversary
presentation of the issues. Only when he has had the benefit of intelligent and
vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his decision.").
146. See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at 50-51.
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self-centered and involves acceptance of duties to make the pro-
cess work because the outcome is dependent on the mutual
cooperation of the parties.' 47
The language of the traditional due process rights model, in
contrast, "focuses on rights to the exclusion of duties."14 The
traditional adversarial system encourages offenders and their
defense attorneys to use their "rights" to take the least amount of
responsibility possible. There is no language of duty or accounta-
bility in traditional conceptions either of offenders' or victims'
rights. 49 Instead, there is a presumed clash of the rights of vic-
tims and offenders, with 'justice" requiring a balance of those
rights. 5° This, indeed, is the precise reason some have proposed
the need for victims' rights constitutional amendments as well as
other victim-focused legislation-to gain a more advantageous
position for victims (as compared to offenders) and to even out a
perceived inequality in the playing field."'
To the contrary, restorative justice processes find much of
their power in the humanization of the "enemy" that takes place
when the parties meet to discuss the offense. If the offender was
not known before to the victim, now she is (and vice versa).
Rights, however, "have their home in the arms-length, imper-
147. In a model of restorative justice that prefers the least coercive pro-
cess necessary to resolve the problem, cooperative processes would be appropri-
ate for the many cases in which the offender admits having done the offense.
Exact details of what happened could be discussed in the restorative confer-
ence, quite possibly arriving at the same or higher degree of certainty of what
actually happened than one could in an adversarial court situation, where the
parties do not want to say more than is required of them. On the other hand, it
is true that either party may have more opportunity to lie in a less adversarial
situation because he/she will not be cross-examined or confronted with as
much contrary evidence. In the case of essential factual disputes (and almost
certainly if guilt is disputed), it may be that the restorative process should be
avoided or aborted. In this case, a less ambitious values model might be an
appropriate incremental step up on the ladder of coercion. If guilt is disputed,
working for a restorative outcome after the factual dispute is resolved in an
adversarial process may be as restorative as the process can be.
148. ROACH, supra note 108, at 36.
149. See, e.g., Martin P. Golding, The Significance of Rights Language, 18
PHIL. Topics 53, 57 (1990) ("[R]ights are brought in to back up some claims or
demands. A right is, as it were, a "moral gun," ... a moral power,... that we
use to morally enforce our claims.").
150. See ROACH, supra note 108, at 31; Tobolowsky, supra note 100, at 102
(stating that since the President's Task Force, the courts and legislatures "have
attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the prescribed rights of the
victim and the defendant").
151. See, e.g., Tobolowsky, supra note 100, at 102 n.295.
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sonal sort of relationship in which the courts tend to view liti-
gants-that is as members of the community of strangers." 152
The concept of an adversarial, impersonal balancing of
rights is contrary to the process-based model of restorative jus-
tice, which emphasizes the offender and victim coming together
to find a solution. More study should be given, though, to the
question of whether an adversarial process may be intrinsically
contrary to a resolution consistent with restorative values.
IV. CURRENT VICTIMS' RIGHTS LAWS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Whether or not the language of rights is somehow intrinsi-
cally contrary to restorative justice, the current victims' rights
laws and proposals are developing largely in a way that is prob-
lematic for the restorative justice vision. Many people believe vic-
tims' rights have been happily appropriated by law-and-order
advocates as a way to be tougher on crime or rehabilitate the
offender, to the detriment of remedying the harm. 153
The adversarial and punitive view of victims' rights held by
the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime can be seen
through the statement of one of its members, who drew a line
between two types of policy: "'The first of these is the hard-line
or victim-oriented viewpoint; the second is the permissive or
criminal-oriented approach.' 154 Andrew Ashworth notes that
both sentence severity and victim involvement in the process
simultaneously escalated recently, suggesting that victims are
being used for traditional offender-focused punishments without
the goal of remedying the harm to the victim.'55
Some of the recommendations of the President's Task Force
allow more victim involvement in the process, which would seem
to be a goal consistent with restorative justice; yet, as applied, the
victim involvement gives no such aid to restorative goals. An
example is one of the most commonly codified victims' rights
152. Golding, supra note 149, at 63.
153. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Victims'Rights, Defendants'Rights and Crim-
inal Procedure, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 185, 186 (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000);
Edna Erez, Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice Through Victim Impact
Statements, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 165, 169 (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000);
Leslie Sebba, The Individualization of the Victim: From Positivism to Postmodernism,
in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL
DEBATES 55, 65 (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000).
154. FRANK CARRINGTON, THE VICTIMS 124 (1975), quoted in Heather
Strang, The Crime Victim Movement as a Force in Civil Society, in RESTORATIVE JUS-
TICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 69, 73 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001).
155. Ashworth, supra note 153, at 186.
provisions, the victim impact statement.'56 The effect of allowing
information about the harm to the victim into the consideration
of sentencing has the effect of changing the focus in the court
from individualization of the offender to individualization of the
victim.' 5 7 The Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee' decided
that the focus on individual emotional impact and characteristics
of the victim was allowable in sentencing.5 9 This shift is not par-
ticularly helpful in light of the restorative goal of de-emphasizing
individualism in favor of a broader relational understanding of
crime.' 60
In addition, studies show that in the professional adversary
system, lawyers and judges alike have tended to try to minimize
victim control of the outcome.'6 1 Such legal professionals limit
the effect of victim impact statements either through comparison
of the actual victim to the "reasonable victim," or by criticizing
the victim's input for lack of objectivity. 16 2 One study showed
victim impact statements were more likely to be introduced in
cases in which the prosecutor felt there was some advantage to
the prosecution in introducing them.'16  Otherwise, legal profes-
sionals were likely to discourage victims from submitting an
impact statement, possibly by reminding the victims that it would
156. A victim impact statement is "a statement made to inform the
[court] of any physical or psychological harm, or any loss or damage to prop-
erty, suffered by the victim as a result of the crime." Erez, supra note 153, at
166.
157. Id. at 167.
158. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
159. Id. at 825 ("'The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the
mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the
sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so
too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society
and in particular to his family.'") (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)).
160. Some argue that although the victim's perspective is promoted as an
argument in favor of tougher laws against offenders, the retributive goals of the
current criminal justice system are actually belied by the shift from focus on the
offender's act to the victim's personalized injury. This individualization of the
victim, through focus on harm because of distinct personal characteristics of
the victim and others affected, arguably has the effect of undercutting propor-
tionality based on the offender's act, a fundamental precept of retribution the-
ory, in favor of disproportional retaliation based on harm to the victim. See, e.g.,
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937,
999-1001 (1985). The Supreme Court's decision in Payne held that such victim
individualization did not necessarily violate the constitutional ban on cruel and
unusual punishments. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
161. Erez, supra note 153, at 171.
162. Id.
163. Roach, supra note 108, at 291.
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mean they would be subject to adversarial examination.' 64 In the
context of a professional adversarial system, the victim impact
statement thus far has had little effect in changing the level of
victim participation in the process, or in outcomes. 6 5 This
example of the current application of one common victims'
rights provision should cause concern for both process-oriented
and values-oriented restorative justice theorists.
V. FINDING A PLACE FOR "RIGHTS" IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
While this discussion demonstrates there are numerous rea-
sons to be wary of presuming victims' rights can be restorative, an
argument can also be made that "rights" are necessary in a restor-
ative justice process in order for it to be just, and that the con-
cept of rights can be reformulated to be more in line with a
restorative justice paradigm.
A. The Need for Rights to Prevent the Masking of Abuse
As both critics and advocates of restorative justice will point
out, a real danger exists that the inherent subjectivization ofjus-
tice, at least in restorative processes, could lead to wildly dispro-
portionate treatment of offenders, depending on the needs,
harm to, and wishes of their victims. Others find victims' rights
necessary to ensure that the morality of the victim's position is
not subsumed by the neutrality of mediation.166 The latter
would be especially important when the victim has ongoing fears
of the offender, or other psychological impediments to fully
asserting her position. Proportionality and power imbalance
concerns should both be important checks on the theory of a
restorative system, because we cannot realistically expect all par-
ties to crimes to behave within restorative ideals, if left
unbounded.
To create a truly restorative system, then, one must ensure
that "restorative justice" does not become the newest benevolent
mask for unjust abuses of power.167 Some theorists believe that a
restorative system must have at least some basic rights assurances
164. Id. at291.
165. Erez, supra note 153, at 173. Some restorative justice practitioners
have not given up hope on the possibility of victim impact statements playing a
restorative role and of converting criminal justice professionals to view victim
participation in a more restorative manner. See infra notes 188-190 and accom-
panying text.
166. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and
Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME &JusT. 1, 95 (1999) (citing Sara Cobb, The Domesti-
cation of Violence in Mediation, 31 LAw AND Soc'y REv. 397, 414 (1997)).
167. Ashworth, supra note 153, at 195.
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for the offender, in order to limit the power of the victim and the
state to determine her future.'6 8 The question, then, becomes
how rights can be incorporated into restorative justice theory in a
way that does not compromise the theory by bringing in individu-
alism, an inappropriately bright line between victim and
offender, and an adversarial, punitive framework.
B. Towards a Restorative Theory of Victims' Rights
The most obvious place in a restorative framework for tradi-
tional victims' rights is in our criminal justice system as it stands
now, to be used as the last resort for assurance that no person is
trodden upon when restorative processes (like victim-offender
mediation or sentencing circles) fail for some reason.1 69 Some
would argue that attempts at restorative processes should be
abandoned, and formal legal rights and processes17° should be
invoked with any crime above a certain level of seriousness.171
No matter how punitive or prosecution-oriented victims' rights
may be in our adversarial system, they are more socially useful
than no such protections at all.
But relegating "rights" to a parallel but separate justice
mechanism, unabashedly abandoning a restorative ideal and
requiring the traditional criminal justice system as a fallback, is
unsatisfying because it does not afford a comprehensive, univer-
sally applicable theory of restorative justice. For restorative jus-
tice to be a viable theory, "practitioners and researchers have to
cope with the tension between human emotional and relational
processes and the formal rules which hold essential guarantees
against misuses of power."172
Thus, a place within the restorative justice paradigm for vic-
tims' rights must exist, but we must consider whether it is the
same form of "rights" currently present in our criminal justice
system.
168. See, e.g., id. at 194.
169. See, e.g., Kay Pranis, Restorative Justice, Social Justice, and the Empower-
ment of Marginalized Populations, in RESTORATIVE COMMUN-y JUSTICE 287, 300
(Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001).
170. Such as those recommended by the President's Task Force on Vic-
tims of Crime. See infra Section II.
171. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 108, at 305 ("To ensure political sur-
vival . . . such a line may be necessary at least until restorative justice has a
proven record of success and the concerns of victim-advocacy and women's
groups can be addressed.").
172. Walgrave, supra note 62, at 277 ("[Restorative justice practitioners
and researchers] must not repress this tension but work within it, in order to
prevent the restorative justice practices from deteriorating into being highly
unjust.").
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1. Elements of a Restorative Conception of Rights
To be consistent with the rest of restorative theory, a restora-
tive theory of rights would have to be non-adversarial and rela-
tional. Restorative rights must not be a zero-sum equation of
power allocation that require careful balancing so that the rela-
tive power of victim and offender cancel each other out. Rather,
a restorative view of rights must be based on mutual benefit.
When stripped down to their basic meaning in our current
criminal justice system, rights are a way of allocating power so as
to create a playing field that society views as fair. This meaning
of rights describes a model of power that is adversarial, with play-
ers having "power against" each other.a7 3 The meaning or pur-
pose of rights in a restorative context should be mutual
promotion of the dignity of all individuals involved, multiplying
the power of each participant with that of the other participants
to arrive at transformation of the situation into something better.
This model can be described as integrative power, or "power
with" one another.'74 The essential nature of integrative power
is cooperation "between equals or near equals."175 Participants
may have to be urged to cooperate to harmonize their goals, but
this is not accomplished through coercion. 176
The concept of integrative power as a restorative model
raises some potential problems. First, the participants should be
at least near equals. Lack of equality may be a serious problem in
the criminal context, when there are likely to be imbalances
because of fear, or lack of material or mental resources. How-
ever, the idea of restorative justice is that justice is not a zero-sum
situation, and the goal is transformation of less than ideal situa-
tions, including problems of power and dignity. Integrative
power with another person involves not just a right, but an obli-
gation that arises in response to the right asserted. Asserting the
right is a form of power because it creates an obligation. Fulfil-
ling the obligation is a form of power because the person assert-
ing the right needs the performance from the other. 7 7 Thus,
"[t]he dignity and freedom of moral agents is promoted in part
by the co-operative process of claiming entitlements and fulfil-
ling obligations.' 1 7
173. See, e.g., KIERAN CRONIN, RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 189-91(1992) (describing the categories of power theorized by psychiatrist Rollo May
in ROLLO MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE (1976)).
174. Id. at 190-91.
175. Id. at 190.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 191.
178. Id. at 204.
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This model of rights and obligations provides a more rela-
tional and non-adversarial concept of rights, one that is not cen-
tered on rights as against the government.'79 With careful
facilitation, initial problems of situational imbalances between
parties may largely be resolved in a restorative process.1 80 In the
cases of participants who are less willing or able to work in an
integrative power framework, a more coercive application of
rights may be required. s1 8  For some process theorists, this may
mean abandoning hope of true restorative justice and settling for
a second-best of the traditional system.18 2 It is possible, however,
to imagine a restorative process theory that begins at the least
coercive level and becomes successively more legalistic.
The second problem with the integrative power concept is
that it espouses non-coercion, yet in reality there will be a certain
level of coercion in most restorative processes, because the loom-
ing alternative (and predecessor) will usually be the traditional
criminal justice system. It is coercion of the offender by the
police that lands her in the criminal justice system, and thus in a
restorative justice process such as victim-offender mediation, and
it is a much higher level of coercion that probably awaits her as a
default if she does not successfully complete such a program. A
lesser level of coercion to successfully complete the program
exists for the victim if he wishes to play a leading role in the out-
come of the process.
Is any level of coercion problematic for a restorative justice
rights model to be based on integrative power? Not necessarily,
because outside pressures can sometimes work towards positive
internal goals. This is one of the reasons that restorative justice
emphasizes the role of the community in justice.' Pressure
179. See Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice and International Human
Rights, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 17, 31 (Burt
Galaway &Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (arguing that a restorative justice framework
offers a coherent way to include the responsibilities, as well as rights, that the
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights has alluded to).
180. See, e.g., MARK S. UMBREIT & JEAN GREENWOOD, GUIDEINES FOR VIC-
TIM-SENSITIVE VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DIA-
LOGUE 8-16 (2000) (describing practical details of mediation that can meet
needs of victim safety and choice).
181. See CRONIN, supra note 173, at 205-206.
182. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE
OF MEDIATION 282-83 (1994). Bush and Folger argue that mediation should
not be about the "bottom line." If parties are unable to reach toward the "com-
passionate strength" ideal, and simply want to deal with a concrete resolution,
the courts, with their rights-protective mechanisms are more appropriate.
Mediation should be about proper, transformative process. Id.
183. See, e.g., Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the Role of the Community,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 93 (Burt Galaway &
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from family and community can positively encourage accounta-
bility. Care must be taken, however, to formulate rights in a way
that takes account of outside pressures to reach a fair result.
The pure subjectivity (and potential disproportionality) of
the result may be tempered when the focus is not simply on pro-
cess, but also on restorative values in the outcome. If a "'correct
restoration"' is required, that means balancing "the seriousness
of the material, relational, and social harm caused by the offence
and the degree of restorative effort imposed on the offender." 184
If, however, a third party assigns objective weights as to the
restorative effect of outcomes, thus potentially vetoing the out-
comes reached through consensus of fairness by the participants,
there is more need for objective rights to protect the participants
from unlimited power of the state, community, mediator, or who-
ever is deciding the objective value of the outcome. 18 5 Such an
objective determination (by a third party) would require addi-
tional formal rights for the affected parties. A theory of restora-
tive victims' rights would be essential if avoidance of
disproportionality is considered part of restorative values.
To summarize, a restorative model of victims' rights would
include a number of elements, and would depend on whether
one is a "process" or "values" theoretician. Restorative victims'
rights could not include an adversarial concept of rights that
clash against each other to reach a balanced outcome. Rather, it
must be relational-including both rights and obligations for all
parties. What these rights and obligations might look like, practi-
cally speaking, depends in large part on how much trust we have
in small groups of people to act properly on broad goals, and
how much we believe a "fair" result means the same result across
group lines. The more specific and numerous the rights and
obligations become, the more coercive the process is likely to be.
2. Current Victims' Rights as Restorative Rights?
As noted before, some current victims' rights concepts seem
facially compatible with restorative justice theory. Simply endors-
ing victims' rights that seem compatible with restorative goals,
however, does not mean that the rights will be restorative in
application. Lode Walgrave notes the danger in introducing res-
Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (stating that communities of victims and offenders
should have certain responsibilities, namely protection of both the victim and
offender from further harm, "set[ting] in motion the healing process of restor-
ative justice," and creation of the "conditions most favorable to the complete
restoration of both the victim and the offender").
184. Walgrave, supra note 62, at 276.
185. Id.
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toration-based victims' rights into the adversarial system. He
argues that the restorative victim perspective is not strong
enough alone to remain undamaged by the goals of the current
system, that diversion may create a "net-widening" effect for less
serious crimes, and that integrating an individualistic victim per-
spective leaves the punitive, adversarial "core" of the system
unchallenged by restorative justice values."8 6 This seems clear
from the present application of victims' rights laws.' For these
rights to be accomplished without losing to mainstream goals any
restorative potential, restorative principles must be firmly
attached as underlying values, something that has largely not
been done thus far.
Many theorists believe restorative values can take hold inside
the traditional criminal justice system. For instance, Edna Erez
has hope in the possibility of a restorative role for the right to
victim allocution during court proceedings through victim
impact statements."' 8 According to Erez, for a restorative vision
to win out, however, a conversion of criminal justice profession-
als to a restorative view of victim participation must occur.
189
Erez does not think this is impossible in the adversarial system
because "including victim input does not disturb the old order;
rather, it can build and improve on it." ' °
The Conflict Transformation Program (CTP) at Eastern
Mennonite University, for one, is actively taking the mutual-bene-
fit approach to try to change the attitudes of legal profession-
als."' Their "defense-based victim outreach" strategy is an
appeal to defense attorneys to "step back from the adversarial
format" when it comes to dealing with victims, 192 and instead
work with victims to arrange a mutually acceptable plea bargain
that meets needs of both victim and offender. CTP's position is
186. Walgrave, supra note 62, at 256; see also ROACH, supra note 108, at 305
("Concerns have also been raised that [victim-offender mediation programs]
will be used only in minor cases and contribute to net-widening. [They] can be
more intrusive than criminal justice processing. For example, a nineteen-year-
old who stole $40 worth of cosmetics agreed as part of a diversion project to
attend fifteen job interviews, research the effect of a criminal record on women
of her age, and spend seventy hours in community service.").
187. See supra Sections III and IV.
188. See, e.g., Erez, supra note 153, at 178-80.
189. Id. at 179.
190. Id. at 179.
191. Telephone Interview with Tammy Krause, Institute forJustice and
Peacebuilding Associate, Conflict Transformation Program, Eastern Mennonite
University (Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Krause].
192. See CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM, EAsTERN MENNONITE
UNrv., PEACEBUILDER 13 (2002).
2004]
602 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
that a restorative system of values is beneficial to the defense
team as well as the victim, for both moral and practical rea-
sons.19 3 A less adversarial approach to dealing with victims has
the potential to catch on with legal professionals, as is evidenced
by the numerous defense teams that have shown interest in
coaching from the program, including the defense team for
Timothy McVeigh.' 94 CTP thus offers one possible model for try-
ing to change the legal culture, working outside of the coercive
power of victims' rights laws to try to introduce restorative justice
to the criminal system.' 95 Such cultural change is necessary
before a formal system of victims' rights may actually be
restorative.
By choosing to work within the traditional adversary system,
though, the possibility remains that a relational restorative model
would be distorted and ultimately absorbed without really chang-
ing the traditional adversarial system. To survive as a separate
theory of justice, restorative justice must not be equated with a
simple court order of restitution to the victim, or respectful treat-
ment of victim-witnesses in court. Rather, it must be a set of
assumptions that underlie the legal process. Such a change
requires a paradigm shift within the legal system.
The question, then, is one of the methodology of change to
restorative values or process: whether incremental change within
traditional adversarial processes can lead to a relational theory of
justice, or whether diversion into a separate, parallel criminal jus-
tice program with a clearly articulated relational framework is
necessary. What does seem clear is that criminal justice profes-
sionals must be convinced that a relational theory is, in fact, a
better paradigm for dealing with crime. Only then may the jus-
tice system may be ready for a paradigm shift. Until then, a few
features of victims' rights that are compatible with restorative jus-
tice are likely to be embraced and absorbed with the "restorative
justice" label, but without the underlying rationale that makes
restorative justice something different from our current system.
The danger of domestication of restorative justice by victims'
193. Krause, supra note 191 (stating that including the victim in a non-
adversarial way in the decision-making or plea bargaining process allows the
defense to be and be seen as more compassionate, allows the defendant to take
accountability, lessens the trauma for the families of those involved, as well as
shortens the judicial process).
194. Id.; CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM, EASTERN MENNONITE
UNIV., PEACEBUILDER 12 (2002).
195. For another attempt at a restorative redefinition of the lawyer's role,
see DOUGLAS NOLL, PEACEMAKING: PRACTICING AT THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND
HUMAN CONFLICT (2003).
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rights is that restorative justice will go the way of other attempted
reforms of the criminal justice system, with certain aspects being
incorporated by the system, but without the underlying theory.1 96
Without a shift in theory about rights, practices that could be
restorative may not actually be restorative.
CONCLUSION
Concern for the victim is shared by victims' rights advocates
and restorative justice advocates. There are numerous problems,
however, in finding a coherent vision for both victims' rights and
restorative justice within traditional justice system processes or in
alternative restorative processes. While this topic needs much
more exposition, a few basic principles are necessary to begin
formulating a restorative vision of victims' rights. A restorative
conception of rights should allow for somewhat blurred lines
between victim and offender in appropriate cases. It should be
relational and non-adversarial, each right raising corresponding
duties. In restorative processes, a difficulty in need of further
development is balancing subjective senses of satisfaction with
objective fairness.
For a restorative values framework of victims' rights to oper-
ate successfully within the current justice system, changing the
legal culture seems essential to retaining the restorative effect.
Although the danger exists that restorative justice will be domes-
ticated into just another sentencing tool of our current justice
system, a unified relational vision does have the potential to offer
a true alternative to the traditional criminal justice system.
196. An example of such an attempted reform is the penitentiary. When
operated on a small scale by a group of people who shared a common vision,
the penitentiary was much different from what it became when the good idea
was institutionalized by the state. See, e.g., VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 4, at
114. The concept of restorative justice does not need to go the same way as the
penitentiary, but caution is in order.
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